Over the last three decades, the whole project of epistemology has been subjected to criticism and change. This process has been marked, successively, by the transfer of epistemic sovereignty to the so ial do ai , the edis o e of o tolog a d atte tio to o stituti e normativity and the political implications of knowledge. Some have even suggested that epistemology should be abandoned altogether as a philosophical project. However, this process has been offset by a proposal for a new epistemology, rooted in the experiences of the global South. This article explores the possibilities of creating a space for dialogue between the various iti ues atu alist, fe i ist, post olo ialist, episte og aphi , epistopic, etc) of epistemology as a philosophi al p oje t, a d Boa e tu a de "ousa "a tos s proposal for an epistemology of the South, taking as a starting point a review of philosophical pragmatism as the most radical form of criticism of conventional epistemology.
Introduction
Over the last three decades, the epistemological project has been subjected to criticism and change, culminating, recently, in proposals to jettison the whole project and its claim to be able to define criteria for establishing what counts as knowledge and how it is validated. This change has successively involved the transfer of epistemic sovereignty to the domain of the so ial, the rediscovery of ontology and the interest in constitutive normativity and the political implications of knowledge.
For some, this might represent the fi al isis of episte olog , o at least its definitive atu alizatio o histo i izatio , to the e te t that it would finally be stripped of its pretensions to determine what counts or does not count as knowledge and to define the criteria that distinguish truth from falsehood. However, at the same time, a constellation of positions has gradually formed that are critical of epistemology, but do not celebrate and promote its demise. Instead, these argue for the need for an epistemology rooted in the * Article published in RCCS 80 (March 2008) . The research underlying this article was conducted as part of the p oje t Biog aphies of o je ts a d a ati es of dis o e i the io edi al s ie es, funded by the Foundation for Science and Technology, Ministry of Science, Technology and Higher Education (POCTI/HCT/59430/2004). I would like to thank my colleagues at the Unit for the Study of Science, Technology a d "o iet , at CE", the stude ts o the do to al p og a e Go e a e, K o ledge a d I o atio (CES/School of Economics, University of Coimbra) and Peter Taylor for having helped me clarify the main lines of argument presented here. This article is part of a long intellectual debate with Boaventura de Sousa Santos, who has given me constant encouragement in my exploration of the epistemological debates and their social, ethical and political implications. experiences of the global South. The most radical formulation of this proposal, and also the ost o siste t ith a a alte ati e thi ki g of alte ati es i this do ai , can be found in the recent work of Boaventura de Sousa Santos, an author who has offered us some of the most advanced and pertinent critical reflections on the long crisis of epistemology as a normative project associated with modern science. As I shall argue here, this project goes beyond the critiques of epistemolog that ha e ope ed up the oute to the p ese t postepiste ologi al i telle tual li ate, adi all e asti g the e otio of episte olog ithi the f a e o k of hat the autho alls post-abyssal thinking.
In this article, I discuss, firstly, the directions taken by critiques of epistemology as a project inseparable from the historical phenomenon of modern science, which have in recent years gone as far as to postulate either the abandonment of epistemological reflection or its reconfiguration based on a debate centred on the sciences and their practices. In the second part, I suggest some possible ways of bridging the gap between these critiques and Boaventura de Sousa Santos s proposal of an epistemology of the South.
This involves revisiting a philosophical current that has had a decisive influence upon the different critical approaches to epistemology, sometimes explicitly, and at other times less visibly, though no less significantly. That current is pragmatism. I deed, "a tos p oposal is quite explicitly a form of epistemological pragmatism, which has continuities with classical pragmatism and its offspring, while at the same time introducing important innovations.
The third part locates this proposal within the project of a more general critique of the abyssal thinking associated with Western modernityand particularly its reflection on the limits of the internal critique of the project of modernity, including the central component that is scienceand within the process of constructing what the same author calls alternative thinking of alternatives, or non-abyssal thinking (Santos, 2007b) . "a tos s proposal is based on a positive affirmation of the great diversity of knowledges existing in the world. According to this conception, characterizing these different knowledges and defining the conditions that validate them will involve a rejection of the legislative ambitions of epistemology and of the possibility of any kind of epistemic sovereignty. The dual reference to epistemology and pragmatism, and their association with the experiences of those that are oppressed by the world in which they live, can help bridge the gap with the critique of epistemology as a philosophical project, and at the same time create a rupture with the assumptions and conditions of that critique.
Thus, it e o es possi le to es ue episte olog i a t o-pronged operation. On the one hand, epistemology will no longer be confined to, or centred on, a reflection about scientific knowledgeeven if that reflection i ol es a atu alist tu , hi h ill ake it indistinguishable from an inquiry into the practices, the production of objects and statements, and their circulation and validation, which define the modes of existence of scientific knowledge. Epistemology would now explicitly cover all forms of knowledgeand would no longer consider them only in relation to scientific knowledgesand would seek to determine the conditions for their production and validation. Those conditions necessarily imply a hierarchization, which, while incompatible with any form of epistemic sovereignty, would also reject the kind of relativism that overlooks the consequences and effects that these knowledges have upon the world, in the name of the equality of all knowledges. The epistemology of the South, as a project, means making a radical break with the modern project of epistemology while at the same time reconstructing a reflection about the various forms of knowledge. As we shall see, this enables us to recognise the limits of those critiques of epistemology that have emerged from within a framework still conditioned by modern science as a central reference for critiquing all forms of knowledge.
This essa does ot p opose a ge ealog of that othe p ag atis , ut athe e plores p ag atis as a attractor. In doing so, it aims to contribute to the research programme outlined by Santos from his conception of the opposition between abyssal and post-abyssal thinking, in particular when stressing the impossibility of recognising the limits of critiques of epistemology within the framework of abyssal thinking. More precisely, it seeks to identify a possible space for dialogue between the epistemology of the South and the various critiques of epistemology -atu alist , fe i ist, postcolonialist, epistemographic, epistopic and pragmatist.
Is epistemology solublein the social, in ontology, in ethics, in politics…?
Epistemology as a philosophical project is inseparable from the emergence and consolidation of modern science. If its aim was to become a theory of knowledge, it has ended up becoming a paradoxical project. On the one hand, epistemology aimed to locate a position that was outside all forms of knowledge and knowledge-production practices, which would allow them to be evaluated independently by judging their capacity to establish distinctions between truth and error, and to define criteria for distinguishing between true and false claims. Borrowing an analogy from the philosophical reflection on power, Joseph Rouse alled this positio episte i so e eig t . However, epistemology not only postulated epistemic sovereignty, it also took as its model one of the forms of knowledge that it proposed to assess, namely science. Epistemology was thus converted from a theory of knowledge into a theory of scientific knowledge. Moreover, from early on, epistemology (particularly in its conventional, empiricist, positivist or realist versions) had to come to terms with the disturbing realisation that, despite its normative pretensions, its statements were rarely invoked by scientistsexcept in very particular situations, usually connected to the public defence of science. Furthermore, these seemed increasingly irrelevant as a way of explaining the practices used for the production of scientific knowledge. Therefore, it is not surprising that, over the course of the 20 th century, a tradition of autonomous self-scrutiny developed amongst scientists working in different disciplines, concerning their own practices and their epistemological implications. 1
But it was during the last decades of the 20 th e tu that this i a e t episte olog e pa ded, i a p o ess that o stituted the ai the e of Boa e tu a de "ousa "a tos s 1987 work Um discurso sobre as ciências [A discourse on the sciences]. This phenomenon also influenced the parallel process that has come to be called the atu alizatio a d histo i izatio of epistemology. Its origins were based on the assumption that the conditions for knowledge production and validation could only be adequately determined from a knowledge of the practices of knowledge production and validation themselves. That process had two main aspects. The first consisted of breaking down the philosophy of science and knowledge into specialised fields, connected to specific disciplines or areas of knowledge and developed in close relationship with the practices and debates taking place in the disciplines concerned. A central criterion here for assessing philosophical statements became their compatibility with the statements produced by the respective scientific practices. One particularly interesting example of this approach is the philosophy of biology (Callebaut, 1993) .
The second aspect led to the development of sociological and historical approaches to the study of epistemological themes and concepts. Episte og aph , as this is called by the historian Peter Dear (2001), thus seeks to examine the origins and transformation of these topics and concepts, through empirically-based studies, involving their practical use in activities of scientific knowledge production and in debates and controversies through which such knowledge is validated. 2
The social studies of scienceboth the different versions of sociology of scientific knowledge and the various currents that Peter Taylor knowledge, beliefs, including religious beliefs, philosophy and the humanities) and to institutionalize the differences between science and opinion, science and politics or science and religion (Gieryn, 1999) . The demarcation of science from non-science is thus a contingent process, and not something that is established once and for all on the basis of so e eig criteria. 3 A significant contribution to this process has been made by feminist critics, both from 2 Eth o ethodologists su h as Mi hael L h ha e suggested the e p essio epistopi s to efe to the stud of forms of practical use or enactment of epistemological concepts and categories (Lynch, 1993, particularly ch. 7) . 3 Throughout the 20 th century, there were a number of attempts to problematise the boundaries between s ie e a d its othe s. The work of pragmatists such as John Dewey (1991a) , the Polish doctor and bacteriologist Ludwik Fleck (1980) , pioneer of the social studies of science, and the reflections of Nils Bohr, mentioned above, are some of the most significant contributions dating from the early decades of the 20 th century to subjects that continue to be central to the debate. within the scientific disciplines themselves and from the philosophy, history and social studies of science. Their critiques enabled certain male biases to be identified both in epistemology and in the theories and substantive knowledge produced by the different disciplines. This influence was most visible in biology and medicine, at least at first. 4 But feminist critiques gradually grew broader in scope, both in disciplinary terms (extending to subjects such as physics, engineering, primatology and the social sciences) and as regards their reflections on the conditions for knowledge production. This resulted in the proposal of o epts su h as st o g o je ti it a d standpoint episte olog Ha di g, , situated k o ledge Ha a a , , so ial k o ledge (Longino, 1990 ) and the inextricability of knowledge and normativity (Longino, 1990 (Longino, , 2002 Clough, 2003; Barad, 2007) .
During the 1990s, a new inflection came to mark the epistemological debate, this time connected to the postulated centrality of practices in accounting for the production of knowledge. This p a ig aphi approach (Mol, 2002) This p a ig aphi approach had two important consequences. The first was to bring the question of normativity to the centre of the debatea subject which would be brought up again using the vocabulary of ethics and politics in many discussions that occurred in this field over the course of the last decade. 5 The se o d is elated to the etu of o tolog as a central concern in the reflection about science and knowledge. Rather than focusing on the conditions of knowledge production and validation, this reflection seems to be primarily oriented towards its consequences and implications, to the differences that knowledge produces in the world. This led to the suggestion that epistemological reflection should be abandoned altogether, or at least relegated to a secondary role, as proposed by the feminist philosopher Sharyn Clough (2003) of what might be described as the internal critique of the epistemological project (Barad, 2007) .
The naturalism defended by Rouse (2002 Rouse ( , 2004 is, for its part, based on two postulates, Lynch & Cole (2005) into the dilemmas experienced by science studies scholars when called to intervene in an expert capacity. 6 Diffractive reading, originally proposed by Donna Haraway (1997) , differs from reflexive reading in that it contrasts disti t i te p etati e positio s so as to p odu e diffe e es that attein the dual sense of being significant and of materially transforming the world. This reading, like any other process of knowledge production, is, in this perspective, a semiotic-material practice. For a detailed presentation and discussion of this approach, see Barad (2007) and the enlightening commentary by Rouse (2004). in the terms laid down by the sciences, then it would no longer be possible to atu alisti all a al se p a ti es that e pli itl i oke those e tities a d hi h o side them to be crucial to their descriptions or explanations of the world. From this perspective, authors such as Bruno Latour (1991 Latour ( , 1996 or Isabelle Stengers (1997) go considerably further, in explicitly assuming the symmetricality of different worldviews and ways of knowing, and in assuming the need to question the terms in which they define the entities and processes that exist in the world. 7
Anyone attentive to these debates cannot fail to note the contribution made by other critical approaches to the project of epistemology, in particular those concerned with modern science as a Eurocentric project and as part of a colonial dynamic that shapes the relationship between scientific knowledge and other forms of knowledge. The works of "a d a Ha di g a e a e a ple of a post olo ial app oa h to the i te al de ate a out epistemology and modern science. But even in this case, it is notoriously difficult to get outside the Eurocentric framework within which this debate has developed. For example, it a e e alled that Ha di g suppo ts the use of the te s ie e to des i e a d value other modes of knowledge that have traditionally been disqualified by modern Eurocentric science. Although this position is understandable as part of a strategy for affirming the value and dignity of other forms of knowledge, it may ultimately end up reinforcing the epistemic authority of science and furthering its reach, instead of questioning the adoption of science and scientific knowledge as a yardstick for gauging the validity and dig it of all fo s of k o ledge. Ha di g s iti ue sho s, therefore, the difficulty of escaping the framework that the epistemological debate has defined for the comprehension of what counts as knowledge. This whole debate, then, including the more radical proposals to abandon the entire epistemological project, clearly shows the problems involved in considering knowledge and its production in terms of a diversity that has no need of a centre, constituted by science.
Might it be possible, then, to design a project that recovers the underlying concerns of 7 This atu alist approach has been criticised from another perspective. For example, Steve Fuller (2000) argues that, in proposing a fragmented vision of science, it ultimately undermines the possibility of constructing forms of accountability and governance of science that are not based upon the immanent normativity of the various scientific practices. The project of a social epistemology, advocated by Fuller, curiously, in aiming to combat that fragmentation, ends up postulating another kind of epistemic sovereignty, based upon the political or civic control of science. Fulle s a gu e t e e theless dese es to e take seriously, since it highlights the problems associated with what has been called the governance of science. epistemology without becoming a hostage to modern science (as a standard for the assessment and validation of other forms of knowledge)? Before moving on to discuss that possibility and the form it might take in the proposal for an epistemology of the South, let us make a brief incursion into a philosophical tradition which it explicitly evokes, and which has had an important influence (though not always explicitly acknowledged) upon the debates mentioned above. That tradition is pragmatism. In the next section, I shall discuss the relevance of pragmatism for epistemology and its critique. do in a particular situation) (Dewey, 1991a) . It is in Dewey that we find the most emphatic formulation of the continuity between the different modes of knowing associated with different forms of collective experience and social life.
Pragmatism, epistemology and epistemological pragmatism
Depending on the commentator, it is possible to read the pragmatists o t i utio s to the theo of k o ledge eithe as a a ti-episte olog hi h postulates the i possi ilit of approaching knowledge other than through its mutually constitutive relations with worldly experience and with the conditions of involvement with the world within communities), or as a current that proposes an original view of epistemology. The first interpretation is supported by the criticisms that Dewey levelled at epistemology at different moments of his long and productive career, from his diat i e agai st that ell-documented a iet of i telle tual teta us alled episte olog De e , to his de u iatio of the episte ologi al i dust , of epistemology as a speculative and self-referential activity consisting of the discussion of concepts with no reference to processes occurring in the world or to the subjects of those processes (Dewey, 1991b) . The second interpretation is supported by the interest that Dewey always showed in knowledge-production processes, the relationship between knowledge and experience, and the validation of knowledge, which are at the centre of some of his most important words, culminating in Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, from 1938. 8 In any case, if we accept the existence of a pragmatist epistemology, the features it displays are substantially different from those exhibited by the currents that dominated epistemology for most of the 20 th century. In fact, at different moments, it led to quite opposing interpretations of the pragmatist project. The idea that all social life, including art, Let us briefly recall some of the main tenets of pragmatist philosophy, particularly as regards knowledge (though this summary will inevitably fail to do justice to the wealth and diversity of positions):
 The pragmatic maxim (Peirce, 1992: 132) postulates that an object (or entity) may be defined by the sum of its effects, that is, by everything that it does, as James would say; this implies that it has no essence, and that it may be redefined as new effects become known. instituted in an operational way and are such that they allow the specific problem that eli ited those ope atio s to e sol ed (Dewey, 1991a: 4) .
 The notion of truth, in this perspective, is associated to what Dewey defined as a a ted asse ti ilit , that is, with statements or claims that are justified and always open to revision (Dewey, 1991a, b) .
Boaventura de Sousa Santos (1989) However, this programme has encountered some difficulties. Assessing a particular mode of knowledge by its consequences implies that there exist criteria on the basis of which that assessment may be made. An assessment is not merely a description of consequences. If we take into account the fact that the knowledge of the knowledges that we are trying to assess is itself subject to conditions that themselves have to be evaluated, it becomes imperative to define criteria and standards of evaluation to enable an account to be given to the group involved in the production or use of that knowledge, or which is affected by it, thereby avoiding relativism. "a tos positio is to take as the sta ti g poi t fo his o eptio of It is this concern that enables us to find a convergence with conceptions of epistemological criticism that seek to shed light on the constitutive dimension of normativity in scientific practices and define the inalienable responsibility of scientists or producers of 9 See Santos, 2003 Santos, -2005 knowledge as regards their effects upon the world (which, as has already been mentioned, has also been called ontological politics). The epistemology of the South, while exploring the legacy of pragmatism (with which it shares the idea of the inseparability of knowledge production and transformative intervention in the world), nevertheless differs from it in that it is explicitly and unequivocally situated on the side of the subaltern and the oppressed. the spaces in which they imprint their histories. In this process, a native concept, that of wunnégin (a Narragansett term which a e t a slated as el o e, and which has equivalents in other native languages and cultures in the region) created the conditions for 10 In discussing the convergence between pragmatism and Latin-American liberation philosophy, Enrique Dussel endorses the idea that pragmatism is the U ited "tates o fo of philosoph , a d that its fi st a te ede ts a e t a ed to 1867, following the Civil War and during the reconstruction period and the beginning of the economic and social transformation that led to the imperial expansion at the end of that century Dussel, :
. Dussel s argument about the convergence of the two philosophical currents may find robust support in the alternative genealogy proposed by Pratt, which will be discussed below.
another mode of relating. This is based upon both recognition and respect for difference and upon the mutual involvement of different communities in such a way as to create peaceful Supported by this genealogy, Pratt redefines the emergence of classical pragmatism:
In the last decade of the 19th century, Dewey, Peirce and James were able to combine the experimental and community-based science of Franklin 12 , the social activism of the feminist 11 For the pragmatists, therefo e, g o th sig ifies so ethi g adi all diffe e t f o the a the te is understood in economics. 12 Pratt suggests reanalysing the concepts and practices of experimental science in Cadwallader Colden and Benjamin Franklin which anticipate concerns expressed by the pragmatists, such as the idea that knowledge of thi gs a d thei diffe e es o sists i thei diffe e t a tio s, o a e of a ti g Colden, qtd. by Pratt, 2002: 196) . The utility of experimental science lies neither in its knowledge of causes nor in its applications, but rather in what things do (that is, how they interact) and in what can be done with that knowledge, whether it is to produce new knowledge or to apply it. As opposed to the usual interpretation of pragmatism, it is not by its utility or application that knowledge is evaluated, but rather by what can be done with it in the future.
pragmatists, and strands of European philosophy into an epistemology and ontology that begins in lived experience. In a sense, the commitments of the indigenous attitude became expressed in still another logic. Starting from the p o ess of dou t a d i ui , i Pei e s terms, this logic joined with James s o eptio of a socially located self, bound by material conditions, physiology, habits and the insights of others, and the joi ed ith De e s expansion of experimental logic to become the logic of cultural naturalism. In each case, the formal philosophical development was framed over an attitude inherited in part from Native American thought as it emerged along the border with European America. That indigenous attitude already expected meaning to be found in interactions against a pluralist background, framed by community, and aimed toward growth. (Pratt, 2002: 283) This perspective may help us understand how and why pragmatism emerges as one of the most radical critiques of abyssal thinkingand of the project of epistemology in particularand at the same time as a resource for rescuing epistemology, for its radical reconstruction as an epistemology of the South, and as part of the emergence of post-abyssal thinking. 13
Rescuing epistemology
In an article that culminates with an extended critical reflection on the different forms of knowledge that coexist and/or confront each other in the world, Boaventura de Sousa Santos grounds his ambitious project of an alternative epistemology, an epistemology of the South, in the broader construction of Western or Northern thinking as abyssal thinking. For anyone who has closely followed the epistemological debates described in the first part of this article, this proposal may cause some perplexity. If epistemology as a philosophical project is inseparable from modern science, and the justification and legitimation of s ie e s episte i authority always lay at its core, then is it even possible to conceive of an epistemology that is not organised around science as a standard for all knowledge?
Although it is not possible to re o st u t the hole ge ealog of "a tos s proposal in this articlethat will have to be left to another occasionit is important to offer a brief, and necessarily simplified account of how one can move from a critique of epistemology (a concern that has ee p ese t i "a tos s work for the last 30 years) to the challenge of an epistemology of the South, which, in more recent works, has been grounded in the 13 Classic pragmatism has given rise to different currents, throughout the 20 th century, often with very different orientations. 'i ha d 'o t s neopragmatism has possibly been the most visible of these currents. However, the vitality of pragmatism, and in particular its ability to change through dialogue and relations with other philosophical and scientific currents and social movements, may be better appreciated through the contributions included in collective works such as Hollinger & Depew (1995) , Hickman (1998) , Dickstein (1998), Haskins & Seiple (1999) , Seigfried (2002) , Shusterman (2004) , Karsenti & Quéré (2004), and Debaise (2007) . See also the i po ta t essa "a tos s contributions to the epistemological debate of the North (Santos, 1987 (Santos, , 1989 (Santos, , 2000 (Santos, , 2003 (Santos, , 2007a (Santos, , 2007b Nunes, 2003 Nunes, , 2007 are characterised by the identification of a cluster of processes and manifestations of crisis which are interpreted within the framework of a more general crisis in the project of modernity. The adje ti e post ode has thus been used at various moments as a form of shorthand for describing a process of transformation that has challenged the project of modern science and its viability. In these contributions, the reflection centred upon the internal dynamics of the sciences and upon what the author would come to describe as manifestations of their internal pluralism. The crisis of conventional epistemologies was approached from a reflection that continued to take the sciences as its main centre, but with one difference: it sought to explore ways of relating the sciences to other kinds of knowledge and experience.
The transition from this reflection to another framework became possible with the growing involvement of the author with the experiences of the South. This raised questions about the relevance of Northern knowledge for dealing with a world that is more than the West, and with a u de sta di g of the o ld that is ot e hausted i the West s comprehension of it, as Santos has affirmed. This transition has been described in various ways by Santos, but it is particularly well summarized in the title of one of his works: F o the post ode to the post olo ial a d e o d "a tos, . Mo e e e tl , it has ee within the opposition between abyssal thinking, associated with modernity, and a postabyssal thinking associated with an ecology of knowledges, that the epistemological di e sio of the o k of o st u ti g a alte ati e thi ki g of alte ati es has led to the formulation of the first outline of what could be a systematic programme of research into epistemological questions raised by the period of transition in which we live (Santos, 2007b) .
A crucial part of this programme would be, precisely, the questioning and redefinition of the criteria and procedures that enable us to establish what counts as knowledge. In this regard, Santos formulates three broad groups of questions, which are worth recalling:
[ How can we identify the perspective of the oppressed in real-world interventions or in any resistance to them? How can we translate this perspective into knowledge practices? In the search for alternatives to domination and oppression, how can we distinguish between alternatives to the system of oppression and domination and alternatives within the system or, more specifically, how do we distinguish between alternatives to capitalism and alternatives within capitalism? (Santos, 2007b: 33) The path indicated by these questions starts from two postulates which at first sight (and in accordance with the criteria used by dominant currents in modern epistemology) seem incompatible. The first is the recognition of the dignity and validity of all forms of knowledge. The second is the rejection of relativism (i.e. the idea that all kinds of knowledge are equivalent). Boa e tu a de "ousa "a tos s position is to consider that acceptance of the first postulate in fact implies acceptance of the second. Recognising the validity and dignity of all knowledges implies that no knowledge may be disqualified before being put to the test, as regards its pertinence and validity in situated conditions. Conversely, no form of knowledge may be granted the privilege of being considered more adequate or valid than others without also being subjected to those situated conditions and being assessed for its consequences and effects. No knowledge may thus be elevated to the status of a standard from which the validity of other knowledges is gauged, without considering the situated conditions of its production and mobilization and their consequences. then it is difficult to justify the exclusion of certain practices that postulate recourse to explanations or interpretations based on entities and processes that are rejected or ignored by one particular form of knowledgemodern science. This is the case, for example, of the reference to supernatural entities or forces, which cannot be described or explained within the rationalist cosmology of modern science, but which are crucial for explanations of the world, things and beings that have been formulated in the context of other cosmologies and forms of active engagement with the world. If the demonstration of the truth of a statement or the effectiveness of an action lies in its consequences, then it makes no sense to postulate the exclusion ex ante of certain forms of description or explanation as false or irrational.
The emergence of the project for an epistemology of the South should be understood as 14 Elsewhere in the same article, Santos suggests that, in the transition period we are now going through, there is a need for a egati e o residual episte olog , o a general epistemology of the impossibility of a general epistemology (Santos, 2007b: 24) . The epistemology of the South, as epistemological pragmatics, will therefore be the form that this transitional epistemology will take. thinking. 15 If we move from this to a constellation of post-abyssal thinking, the terms are reappropriated in different frames of meaning and different contexts of practice. As it is not possible, at least in the present transitional phase, to simply eliminate the old terms and replace them with radically new ones, all conceptual or categorial innovation will necessarily entail a process of reappropriation and transformation.
But for this reason, it becomes even more important to closely examine the transformations that these terms will go through in that process, and what they will come to mean under the new conditions of use. One of the implications of that reappropriation of the concept of epistemology is the fact that it is tightly bound, anchored and rooted in historical experiences that situate its protagonists and which enable that project to be ou d to a oade o stellatio of li e atio . The epistemology of the South thus appears as a radical refounding of the relationship between the epistemological, the ontological and the ethico-political, based upon a reflection that is not centred on science but on practices, experiences and knowledges that define the limits and the conditions in which a particular mode of knowledge may e t a slated o app op iated under new circumstances, without aiming to establish itself as a universal knowledge. If all knowledges were recognised, the validity of each would depend upon the way it were bound to the situated pragmatic conditions of its production and appropriation. The hierarchies of knowledges cannot be defined on the basis of the epistemic sovereignty of one mode of k o ledge o o e e te al locus of knowledge, but rather in a pragmatic manner, that is to say, inseparable from the situated practices of knowledge production. This is the type of elatio ship that "a tos alls the e olog of k o ledges :
The ecology of knowledges does not conceive of knowledges in the abstract, but rather as knowledge practices that enable or impede certain interventions in the real world; it no longer conceives of science as a reference or compulsory point of passage for the recognition of all knowledges. Thus, it is the conception of epistemology itself that is radically transformed. An epistemological pragmatics is, above all, justified by the fact that the life experiences of the oppressed only appear intelligible to them through an epistemology of consequences. In the world in which they live, consequences always come before causes. (Santos, 2007b: 28) If the epistemology of the South is characterised by an epistemological pragmatism that privileges consequences above causes, might we not find here a point of convergence with the epistem-onto-ethi al o e s of atu alist a d fe i ist iti ues of epistemology?
The influencenot always acknowledged, but nonetheless presentof philosophical pragmatism in these critiques at least enables us to establish a possible starting point for an exercise in translation that may help identify common concerns, as well as divergent conceptions that engage the two fields in dialogue.
Conclusion
To conclude, let us return to the proposal mentioned above according to which Boaventura de Sousa Santos seeks to give shape to the task of the episte ologi al o st u tio of a ecology of knowledges "a tos, :
. The autho ide tifies th ee ai g oups of questions related to the identification of knowledges, the procedures that enable us to relate them to each other and to nature, and the assessment of the interventions in the real o ld that the e a le ibid). In relation to the first group, it is claimed that the questions aised ha e ee ig o ed the episte ologies of the glo al No th ibid). In fact, the claim is true also for the other two groups. As a philosophical project, the epistemology of the North, as was recalled in Section 2, always had as its goal the identification of a particular form of knowledge, scientific knowledge, and the criteria that enabled science to be demarcated from other modes of knowledge. Indeed, it is the attribution of the quality of k o ledge to a ode of i ol e e t o elationship with the world that constitutes the ultimate objective of epistemology. Hence, the questions posed by Santos are relevant to epistemology only insofar as they enable the work of demarcation, which attributes epistemological privilege to science, defining it as the mode of producing true knowledge about the worldand thus the interest in othe odes of k o ledge o l as othe s of science, unable to establish the distinction between truth and error. A programme such as this is incapable of recognising other modes of knowing, other than to subject them to a form of epistemic sovereignty that takes science as a model for all true methods of knowing.
This o se atio suggests the eed fo a e use of the o d episte olog , which would come to mean, not an alternative philosophical programme, but what Santos calls an alternative programme of alternatives, setting the notion of ecology of knowledges against all forms of epistemic sovereignty. Here we come up against the well-known problem of having to use the conceptual and theoretical tools of Northern thinking in a subversive way.
As Santos asks
: , how can we fight against the abyssal lines using conceptual and political tools that do not reproduce them? The response has to be pragmatic. In using the e p essio episte olog of the "outh, we are using it within a framework that is different from the familiar framework in which we usually understand epistemology, one that is nonetheless suitable for the new questions that cannot be formulated within what Santos has called abyssal thinking.
The (explicit) connection of the proposal for an epistemology of the South and its corollary, the conception of the universe of knowledge as an ecology, to a pragmatist conception of knowledges and of the ways in which they are produced, validated, circulated, appropriated, shared and evaluated, also enables us to highlight the relevance of an alternative thinking of epistemological alternatives, and find convergences that make possible a productive dialogue with the most recent innovative epistemological critiques, such as those that have appeared in connection with the social studies of science, feminist a d post olo ial studies a d the atu alist philosoph of the s ie es.
The pragmatism advocated by Santos, however, despite its apparent kinship with the philosophical current of the same name, is in fact a radical reconstruction that results from the encounter between the experiences of subaltern populations, groups and collectives, particularly in the global South, and the act of putting the proposals of pragmatist philosophers such as William James and John Dewey to o k for the critique of conventional epistemologies. It is in the explicit reference to the world and experiences of the oppressed as a place of departure and arrival for another conception of what counts as knowledge, that the epistemology of the South confronts pragmatism with its limits. Those limits are the limits of the critique of epistemology within the framework of abyssal thinking.
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